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Don Marquis 
In "Harming Someone after His Death," Barbara Baum Levenbook argues 
that, on the one hand, one can account for the harm of murder to the 
victim and the harm of destroying the reputation of a dead person or 
breaking a promise to a dead person if one understands harms as losses. 
On the other hand, if one understands harms as invasions of interests, 
then one can make sense of neither the harm of murder to the victim 
nor the posthumous harms mentioned above.' 
The reasons she offers do not appear to support such an asymmetry. 
Consider her argument that the harm of murder cannot be understood 
(in the manner of Feinberg) as an invasion of an interest.2 Let the moment 
of death be the first moment at which the victim no longer exists. Assume 
no immortality. On the one hand, the invasion cannot occur earlier than 
the moment of death; otherwise, one would be alive, not dead; hence, 
not murdered; hence, not yet having had one's interest invaded. On the 
other hand, the invasion cannot occur at the moment of death or later 
either. "Since he does not exist at this time ... he has no interests, 
including the interest in remaining alive to be invaded at this time" 
(p. 410). Hence, being murdered cannot invade the victim's interest in 
remaining alive. So much for Feinberg's view via an argument that is 
the development of a point made by Epicurus.3 
Why won't the same sort of Epicurean argument work against Lev- 
enbook's loss account of harm? After all, the loss that one suffers due 
to one's murder cannot occur earlier than the moment of death since, 
if it did, one would be alive; hence, not dead; hence, not murdered; 
hence, not yet having lost anything. But at the moment of death or later, 
one no longer exists; hence there is no victim to suffer the loss. So 
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Levenbook's account of the harm of murder is subject to the same Ep- 
icurean difficulty to which Feinberg's account is subject. 
Levenbook's central contention is that posthumous harms such as 
breaking a promise to a dead person or destroying the reputation of a 
dead person can be understood as losses to that person. Her case for 
this is based on the claim that the harm of murder can be understood 
as a loss to the victim, and, if the harm of murder can be so understood, 
then posthumous harms can also be so understood. Levenbook grants 
that it is paradoxical to hold that "one can lose something at the moment 
that he ceases to exist" (p. 415). But she argues that a good reason for 
making such an assumption is that it "has the advantage of preserving 
the important pretheoretic conviction that murder harms its victim" 
(p. 415). If Levenbook is right about this, then why can't Feinberg and 
the rest of us also make the assumption that one's interest (in particular, 
one's interest in staying alive) is invaded at the moment one ceases to 
exist? "Paradoxical" though it may be, a good reason for holding it also 
is that it "has the advantage of preserving the important pretheoretic 
conviction that" my murder would invade my interest in staying alive. 
This resuscitates Feinberg. Again, Levenbook can't have it both ways. 
The Epicurean argument does seem to have wildly counterintuitive 
consequences for the supposed harm of murder or the supposed loss of 
life. Hence, most of us bracket off that argument in most philosophical 
contexts to get on with our work on the ethics of killing and related 
issues. That seems legitimate. The argument seems intractable. The cash 
value of Partridge's recent paper is that Feinberg's account of posthumous 
harms does not successfully avoid the Epicurean difficulty.4 It is also 
legitimate to take that argument seriously, of course. But it will hardly 
do to use it against others if one is unprepared to accept it as an objection 
against one's own views! Levenbook (thinking of her own view) admits 
that "there are, undoubtedly, real difficulties of a metaphysical and me- 
taethical nature in the thesis that someone can be harmed after he no 
longer exists" (p. 418). Indeed! The lack of specificity of this remark 
disguises the fact that the major metaphysical difficulty is the Epicurean 
argument. Either the difficulty is conclusive or it isn't. If it is, then Lev- 
enbook's account is unsound. If it is not, then Levenbook has failed to 
show that Feinberg's analysis is inferior to hers. Hence, Levenbook's 
analysis is unsound. 
Levenbook's position does nothing to dispel the grossly counterintuitive 
character of claims such as 'The diminution of Einstein's reputation now 
is a loss to Einstein' because it does nothing to provide us with an un- 
derstanding of how it is possible for a nonexistent person to suffer a loss 
(p. 417). The argument that it must be so, otherwise, murder would not 
be a harm does not resolve the issue. It merely adds to the perplexity. 
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The problem can be put thus: the Epicurean argument seems to establish 
the truth of the conditional, 
If one cannot suffer a harm when one does not exist, then murder 
does not harm its victim. 
The use of both modus ponens and modus tollens seems plausible here 
if one notes the plausibility of both the antecedent and the denial of the 
consequent. But one cannot endorse both arguments. The use of neither 
modus ponens nor modus tollens seems plausible here if one reflects on 
the utter implausibility of both the consequent and the negation of the 
antecedent. Surely we wish to endorse one of those arguments. Levenbook 
chooses modus tollens when discussing her own theory. An adequate 
analysis must explain why. Levenbook does not. 
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